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Abstract 
Mobile Ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-organizing multi-hop wireless network, where the topology of the 
network changes dynamically. Security attacks and limited energy are the most critical issues in MANETs. 
Meanwhile, to save energy, some nodes may opt for routing misbehavior such that they take part in routes 
finding process but do not forward data packets. Detecting and mitigating routing misbehavior, forcing 
malicious nodes to cooperate, and extending lifetime of the network should be considered in routing 
decisions. This paper proposes a Power Aware Cooperation Enforcement (PACE) distributed mechanism to 
help nodes make intelligent routing and forwarding decisions. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Mobile Ad hoc networks MANETs are highly vulnerable to several types of attacks, due to their open medium 
and lack of centralized management. Security attacks and limited energy are the most critical issues in MANETs. 
Multi-hop routing, random movement of mobile nodes and other features unique to MANET lead to enormous 
communication overhead for route discovery and maintenance. Meanwhile, to save energy, some nodes may opt for 
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routing misbehavior such that they take part in routes finding process but do not forward data packets. Detecting and 
mitigating routing misbehavior, forcing malicious nodes to cooperate, and extending lifetime of the network should 
be considered for routing decisions in MANET. All of these make routing in MANET a very challenging problem. 
The different types of attacks have inspired a lot of research work to find mechanisms to defend against these 
attacks1.  Watchdog and Pathrater2 were proposed to increase throughput in MANETs by complementing DSR with 
a watchdog for detection of denied packet forwarding and a pathrater for trust management and routing policy rating 
every path used. CONFIDANT3 detects misleading nodes by means of observation. It aggressively informs other 
nodes of this misbehavior through reports sent around the network.  CORE4 is a collaborative reputation mechanism 
which has a watchdog component.  It is a technique used to detect selfish nodes. However it is complemented by a 
reputation mechanism that differentiates between subjective reputation (observations), indirect reputation (positive 
reports from other nodes) and functional reputation (task specific behavior). These are weighted for a combined 
reputation value which is used to make decisions for the cooperation or the gradual isolation of the node. 
Observation based cooperation enforcement in ad hoc networks (OCEAN)5 relies on direct observations of 
interactions with neighbors to measure their performance in order to avoid the vulnerability of false accusation from 
second-hand reputation exchanges. OCEAN attempts to mitigate selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks. It is 
using the same concepts deployed in the watchdog and pathrater, Moreover it also punishes the selfish and 
misbehaving nodes in order to force them to cooperate in the network. 
The objective of this paper is proposing an energy aware routing protocol to detect and avoid misbehaving and 
malicious nodes existing in the network. It should help MANET nodes making intelligent routing and forwarding 
decisions while extending the lifetime of MANET. Moreover it mitigates routing misbehavior and enforces the 
cooperation of malicious nodes inside the network. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the PACE mechanism and its components. Section 3 
explains the implementation for PACE-AOMDV. Section 4 clarifies the implementation for PACE-DSR. Section 5 
presents an illustrative example. Section 6 presents simulation environment and results. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
2. PACE Mechanism Description 
PACE mechanism combines the knowledge of misbehaving nodes and link reliability to pick the most reliable 
path for MANET routing decision.  Its functionality resides between the network and MAC layers of the protocol 
stack. PACE targets the misleading nodes in MANET which take part in routes finding process but do not forward 
data packets. The mechanism discovers the misleading routing behavior by saving a copy of data packet after 
sending in a node's cache, and monitoring the neighboring node for a given period of time.  It produces a positive or 
negative event as a monitoring result which reflects in the rating of the neighboring node. If the rating is lower than a 
predefined faulty threshold, the neighbor node is added to the list of misbehaving nodes (faulty list). This faulty list 
is broadcasted and processed with each RREQ to guarantee that routing paths do not include any misbehaving nodes.  
The faulty threshold should be set in an appropriate way which compromises the accuracy of detection of the 
malicious nodes and the overall network performance. By setting a low threshold value results in falsely accusing 
high count of nodes as malicious and worse network performance. Whereas setting a high threshold value would 
result in late malicious nodes detection, which affects as well the overall network performance.  The accused 
misbehaving nodes are given a second chance by giving them a specific time to return to the network, as it is 
possible that they are wrongly accused of misbehaving or they may improve their behavior in this time period. 
To enforce malicious nodes to cooperate in PACE, other non-misleading nodes will isolate them from the 
network by rejecting all their traffics. Hence each malicious node is forced to cooperate in the network in order to 
have its own packets forwarded. 
The mechanism compensates the energy lost in monitoring and overhearing neighbor nodes, by guaranteeing that 
only reliable nodes with highest residual energy are considered in the path selection process, and thus extended the 
lifetime of MANET. In the route request, each node evaluates its own faulty list and remaining residual energy. 
Before the RREQ is re-broadcasted, it is delayed with a jitter value inversely proportional to the available residual 
energy of the node. If multiple copies of the same RREQ are received by an intermediate node, only first received 
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copy is considered. Other received copies of RREQs with the same IDs are automatically discarded. This technique 
guarantees that only reliable nodes with the highest residual energy are considered in the path selection process.  
The source node receives a list of the most reliable paths with no malicious node. Then it selects the route which 
has minimum number of nodes whose residual energy is below a certain threshold. 
2.1. Malicious Node Detection Components 
To implement the functions of detecting malicious nodes and cooperation enforcement, the following five 
modules are add to the layer between MAC and network protocol:   
x NeighborWatch which observes the behavior of the neighbors of a node. 
x RouteRanker which holds the nodes ratings for the neighbor nodes. 
x Rank-based Routing which applies the information from NeighborWatch in the actual selection of routes. 
x Malicious Traffic Rejection performs the straightforward rejection of traffic from nodes that are considered 
misleading. 
x Second Chance Mechanism that is intended to consider the nodes that were previously considered misleading to 
become useful again. 
3. Implementation of PACE-AOMDV Protocol 
Ad Hoc On demand Multipath Distance Vector Routing AOMDV protocol6 is a reactive unicast routing protocol 
for MANETs. AOMDV protocol is an extension to the AODV protocol for computing multiple loop-free and link 
disjoint paths. The routing entries in routing tables at nodes contain a list of the next-hops along with the 
corresponding hop counts for each destination to which it currently has a route. Routing table entry expires if it has 
not been used or reactivated for a pre-specified expiration time.  
When a source node requires sending packets to a destination it does not have a route to, it initiates a route 
discovery operation. In the route discovery operation, the source broadcasts route request (RREQ) packets. A RREQ 
includes addresses of the source and the destination, the broadcast ID, which is used as its identifier, the last seen 
sequence number of the destination as well as the source node’s sequence number to guarantee the freshness of the 
routing information. When the destination or a node that has a route to the destination receives the RREQ, a route 
reply (RREP) packet is created and forwarded back to the source. RREP follows the reverse path of the respective 
RREQ. Upon receiving the RREP packet, each intermediate node along the route updates its next-hop table entries 
with respect to the destination node. When a node discovers a link disconnection, the affected source can re-initiate a 
route discovery operation if the route is still needed. 
To implement PACE-AOMDV, a new parameter “low_energy_count” is added to original data structure of 
RREQ, RREP, and routing table. The new parameter holds the number of nodes till the destination with residual 
energy less than a previously set threshold value.  
4. Implementation of PACE-DSR Protocol 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 7 is a reactive unicast routing protocol that utilizes source routing algorithm. In 
source routing algorithm, each data packet contains complete routing information to reach its destination. 
Additionally, in DSR each node uses caching technology to maintain route information that it has learnt. 
To send a data packet, the source node consults its route cache for destination route. If the required route is 
available, the source node includes the routing information inside the data packet before sending it. Otherwise, the 
source node initiates a route discovery operation by broadcasting route request packets. A route request packet 
contains addresses of both the source and the destination and a unique number to identify the request. Receiving a 
route request packet, a node checks its route cache. If the node does not have routing information for the requested 
destination, it appends its own address to the route record field of the route request packet. Then, the request packet 
is rebroadcasted. 
If the route request packet reaches the destination or an intermediate node has routing information to the 
destination, a route reply packet is generated. When the route reply packet is generated by the destination, it 
165 Abeer Ghander and Eman Shaaban /  Procedia Computer Science  73 ( 2015 )  162 – 171 
comprises addresses of nodes that have been traversed by the route request packet. Otherwise, the route reply packet 
comprises the addresses of nodes the route request packet has traversed concatenated with the route in the 
intermediate node’s route cache. 
To implement PACE-DSR, a new parameter “residualEnergy” is added to original existing “Path” class. The 
class has node IDs forming the routes in the source node, and “residualEnergy” parameter which holds the residual 
energy of each node in the list of nodes forming the route in the source node. 
 
5. Illustrative Example 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Power Aware Cooperation Enforcement Example 
Fig. 1 shows an ad hoc network where source node S needs to communicate with destination node D, there is no 
known route to reach D in primary and secondary caches of the source node. Nodes Y and Q are malicious. Assume 
that the path energy threshold is 1 joule. The maximum rating for a node is +40, and the minimum rating is -40. 
Assume that the residual energies of the nodes of the network are as follows: {(T, 1.1), (U, 3.2), (V, 1.4), (W, 0.4), 
(X, 1.2), (Y, 3.6), (Z, 2.1), (Q, 3.5), (R, 3.2), (D, 1.8)}. PACE mechanism will filter the route request when it reaches 
Y because it is a malicious node. Hence, it returns paths with non-malicious nodes to source nodes. 
Applying proposed PACE-DSR protocol to MANET, the following RREP packets are returned back to source 
node S: {(S), (T, 1.1), (U, 3.2), (V, 1.4), (D)}, {(S), (W, 0.4), (X, 1.2), (D)}.  
Each RREP packet includes two interesting fields: node ID and its residual energy. The second path has one node 
W with energy less than the path energy threshold. Then the first path is the most reliable path with no malicious 
nodes, the proposed PACE-DSR selects it for routing.  
Applying PACE-AOMDV Protocol, the following RREP packets are returned back to source node S: 
x {T, 3 hops, 0 low energy nodes} Æ D 
x {W, 2 hops, 1 low energy nodes} Æ D 
Each RREP request is returned back to the source node with three fields: node ID of next hop to D, number of 
hops to D, and count of nodes till D with residual energy less than 1 Joule. Although the first path has the maximum 
number of hops, it is the most reliable path, and the proposed PACE-AOMDV protocol selects it for routing. 
6. Performance Evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism, each of PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV is 
implemented using NS2 simulator8. We set up a network with 40 nodes in 1500m X 300m area. The network model 
parameters used for the simulation are shown in Table 1. The radio propagation model is the realistic two-ray ground 
and the mobility model is RandomWayPoint. In the random waypoint model, each node is placed randomly in the 
simulated area. After remaining at the location for a specified pause time, the node randomly selects another 
destination from the physical terrain. Then the node moves to the new location at a speed uniformly chosen between 
a minimum and maximum speed (20 m/sec). After reaching the destination, the node stays there for a defined pause 
time period. The simulation run time is 2000 seconds. We chose 0 seconds pause time to model the highly dynamic 
network, 1000 seconds pause time to model the moderate speed network and the 2000 seconds pause time used to 
model the static network. 
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Table 1. Simulation Setup Parameters. 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value  
Send Rate 4.0 pkt/s Node Rating after second chance -30  
Packet Size 512 bytes Initial Energy 5 Joule  
Traffic model CBR Transmission Power 31.32e-3 Joule  
Maximum Connections 20 Receiving Power 35.28e-3 Joule  
Packet Timeout 1 msec Idle Power 712e-6 Joule  
Rating Increment +1 Sleep Power 144e-9 Joule  
Rating Decrement -2 Energy Threshold 1.5 Joule  
Second Chance Timeout 30 sec    
 
The protocols are analyzed with varying number of malicious nodes and pause time.  The malicious nodes are 
simulated as a black hole attack which contributes in the route discovery and drops the data packets. We compare the 
performance of the proposed protocols DSR, AOMDV, PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV. All measurements are 
averaged over 10 simulation runs. We measure the following performance metrics: 
x Throughput: is the rate of total received packets generated by all sources nodes of the network. Throughput is 
calculated by equation9 (1):  
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 =  ∑ ௥(௜)೙೔సబ௧                       (1) 
𝑟 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ,  𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
 
x Delay: is the average end-to-end delay in receiving data packets generated by the sources. This includes all 
possible delays caused by buffering during route discovery, queuing delay at the interface, retransmission delays 
at the MAC, propagation and transfer times9.  
x Residual Energy: is the overall residual energy of the network. It is calculated as the summation of residual 
energies of each non-malicious node of the network divided by the total non-malicious nodes count. The residual 
energy is calculated by equation (2): 
𝑒 =  ∑ ఘ(௜)೙೔సబ௡                                          (2) 𝜌 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦, 𝑛 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 
 
x Routing Overhead: is the total number of control packets sent over the network. 
x Detection Accuracy of Malicious Nodes: is a metric which evaluates the accuracy of malicious nodes detection 
by calculating the number of truly malicious nodes in the network reported by the protocol. 
6.1. Throughput 
Fig. 3 shows the throughput for the proposed protocols PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV, and the original 
protocols DSR and AOMDV for different mobility speeds with varying number of malicious nodes. It indicates that 
the PACE mechanism gives better performance in terms of throughput when integrated with DSR and AOMDV. For 
highly dynamic network, there is a significant improvement of 17% in the throughput for the proposed PACE-
AOMDV compared to the original AOMDV. On the other hand, a slight improvement of 5% for moderate speed and 
2% for static networks is obtained.  
In PACE-DSR, the static network has a performance gain improvement of 41% compared to original DSR. While 
in moderate speed the gain was 22% and in dynamic networks it reached 21%. 
For different mobility speeds, the proposed PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV outperform original DSR and 
AOMDV protocols regardless malicious nodes count. This performance gain of proposed protocols is due to PACE 
mechanism which selects the most reliable routing path with no malicious nodes, and with highest residual energy to 
extend the network lifetime. On the other hand, in original protocols, the selection of the route is only based on the 
167 Abeer Ghander and Eman Shaaban /  Procedia Computer Science  73 ( 2015 )  162 – 171 
minimum number of hops to destination, and moreover it may comprise malicious nodes that discard packets and 
reinitiate a route discovery process. 
 
Fig. 2. Throughput with different mobility speeds (a) highly dynamic network; (b) moderate speed network; (c) static network. 
Fig. 2 also illustrates that for varying network speeds, the throughput decreases with increasing malicious node 
counts since more packets are dropped. Dynamic network has lower throughput compared to static for a specific 
number of malicious nodes due to the frequent link failures which increase the overhead of route discovery and the 
late detection of malicious nodes which increases packets dropped by them. 
PACE mechanism gives better performance in terms of throughput when integrated with DSR compared to 
AOMDV for different speeds regardless malicious node counts. For the static network, a high improvement of 29% 
obtained in throughput for the PACE-DSR compared to PACE-AOMDV, while in moderate speed network, the 
improvement is 18% and 11% in highly dynamic network. This returns to the path selection which has to be at each 
forwarding node for AOMDV resulting in high packet drop of the network, consequently degrades the throughput. 
For confidence level 95%, throughput range is within 4%-14% of the sample mean. 
6.2. Delay 
Fig. 3 shows the delay for the proposed protocols PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV, and the original protocols 
DSR and AOMDV for different mobility speeds with varying number of malicious nodes. It shows that the PACE 
mechanism gives better performance in terms of delay when integrated with DSR in static with 80% and moderate 
speed networks with 54% compared to original DSR, since the selected routes are stable with less link breakages. 
For highly dynamic network, the high percentage of malicious nodes in the network up to 25% has no effect on the 
delay, since the PACE-mechanism is able to select the safe route with high lifetime. In the highly dynamic network 
the delay was degraded by 0.8%. In original DSR, it is highly probable that DSR will select a route with malicious 
nodes, which leads to high route discovery frequency. 
There is a slight improvement in delay for PACE-AOMDV in static networks compared to original AOMDV with 
12%. On the other hand, the performance degrades in moderate networks by 47% and in highly dynamic networks 
by 60%, due to the overhead of the PACE mechanism to avoid selecting the malicious nodes in routes and high 
frequency link breakages. 
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Fig. 3. Delay with different mobility speeds (a) highly dynamic network; (b) moderate speed network; (c) static network. 
PACE mechanism gives better delay when integrated with AOMDV compared to DSR for different scenarios. In 
highly dynamic network, PACE-AOMDV outperforms PACE-DSR with 89%. In moderate speed network, the 
improvement is 81% and in static networks, the improvement is 84%. 
6.3. Routing Overhead 
 
Fig. 4. Routing overhead with different mobility speeds (a) highly dynamic network; (b) moderate speed network; (c) static network. 
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Fig. 4 shows the routing overhead for the proposed protocols PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV, and the original 
protocols DSR and AOMDV for different mobility speeds with varying number of malicious nodes. 
PACE-DSR has significant improvement compared to original DSR in terms of routing overhead for different 
scenarios. In static networks, the improvement is 79%, since the static network does not search for new routes from 
source to destination which significantly decreases the control packets being sent over the network. In moderate 
speed networks, the improvement is 67% and highly dynamic network is 38%. Original DSR is highly probable to 
select routes with malicious nodes which increase the control packets being sent in the network with the re-initiation 
of route discovery process. 
PACE-AOMDV has a degraded performance in terms of routing overhead compared to original AOMDV. It 
reaches 54% in static networks, 49% in moderate speed networks, and 20% in highly dynamic networks. The 
degradation is due to the added overhead to find a safe route with long lifetime required by the PACE-AOMDV. 
PACE mechanism gives better routing overhead when integrated with DSR compared to AOMDV, since 
AOMDV is a multipath routing protocol that searches for multiple disjoint paths. The improvement shows in static 
networks by 83%, in moderate speed networks by 75% and highly dynamic networks by 30%. 
6.4. Residual Energy 
 
Fig. 5.Residual energy with different mobility speeds (a) highly dynamic network; (b) moderate speed network; (c) static network. 
Fig. 5 shows the residual energy for the proposed protocols PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV, and the original 
protocols DSR and AOMDV for different mobility speeds with varying number of malicious nodes. 
PACE-DSR consumes more energy in avoiding routes with malicious nodes; achieving higher throughput when 
compared to original DSR. The residual energy improvement reaches 14% in static networks, 51% in moderate 
speed network and 68% in highly dynamic networks. 
PACE-AOMDV has higher residual energy compared to the original AOMDV in highly dynamic and in 
moderate speed networks, due to the punishment mechanism introduced by the PACE mechanism. The non-
malicious nodes will not forward the traffic on behalf of malicious nodes. Hence, it will reserve the energy of the 
network. 
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Power aware component incorporated into PACE mechanism helps to compensate the extra energy consumed in 
overhearing process required by PACE mechanism, and maintains an acceptable level of residual energy in both 
PACE-AOMDV and PACE-DSR. 
6.5. Malicious Nodes Detection Accuracy 
Fig. 6 shows the malicious nodes detection accuracy for both PACE-DSR and PACE-AOMDV with different 
network speeds for variable numbers of malicious nodes injection (3, 5, 7, and 10 injected malicious nodes). For 
PACE-DSR, In highly dynamic and moderate speed networks, high percentage of malicious nodes are successfully 
detected as malicious, due to high frequent nodes movement which increases the chance of detection. In highly 
dynamic network, 100% of the injected nodes of the network are detected. In the moderate speed networks, 98% of 
the injected nodes are detected, and in static networks, only 60% of the injected malicious nodes are detected. 
For the PACE-AOMDV, the detection accuracy is 85% for highly dynamic networks, 74% for moderate speed 
networks, and 36% for static network. PACE-DSR has higher malicious nodes detection accuracy compared to 
PACE-AOMDV. 
 
Fig. 6. Malicious nodes detection accuracy (a) PACE-DSR; (b) PACE-AOMDV 
Table 2 indicates the performance metrics comparison for PACE mechanism when integrated with DSR and with 
AOMDV in highly dynamic and static networks. The tables indicate which protocol has the favored performance for 
each metric. 
Table 2.Summary for performance metrics comparison 
       Highly dynamic networks           Static networks  
Metric PACE-DSR PACE-AOMDV PACE-DSR PACE-AOMDV  
Throughput ݲ  ݲ   
Delay  ݲ  ݲ  
Routing Overhead ݲ  ݲ   
Residual Energy  ݲ ݲ   
Detection Accuracy ݲ  ݲ   
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a Power Aware Cooperation Enforcement (PACE) distributed mechanism that can easily 
integrated with MANET routing protocols to help nodes make intelligent routing and forwarding decisions. 
Integrating PACE mechanism with DSR and AOMDV helped to detect and isolate malicious nodes in the network. 
Moreover, it obtained safe routes bypassing malicious nodes in the network without sacrificing the network 
performance. Additionally, power aware component incorporated into PACE mechanism managed to save nodes 
energy and increase the lifetime of the network. 
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In highly dynamic networks, PACE-AOMDV outperformed PACE-DSR significantly in terms of average end-to-
end delay and network lifetime. This makes PACE-AOMDV a good choice for highly dynamic networks 
applications. In static networks, PACE-DSR gave a satisfactory throughput performance compared to PACE-
AOMDV while there was no significant difference for the delay and network lifetime performances. This makes 
PACE-DSR a good choice for static networks applications. 
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